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Editor: Jay GanPesticide packages that are discarded on agricultural land can contaminate water bodies and pose a threat to the
environment and human health. Little is known about how developing countries deal with this kind of land pol-
lution. While in developed countries, packages are collected by professional organizations, the smallholder con-
text in developing countries makes the collection of this waste much more difﬁcult. This paper introduces and
analyses a successful Pesticide Package Collection Scheme in one of the poorest regions in China, i.e. Guangxi
Province. The purpose of the paper is to analyze and discuss how such a scheme can be established by multiple
actors. The paper ﬁnds that the underlying success factors for establishing such a scheme are 1.) that a scheme
piggy-bags on existing economic structures that reach out to farmers (e.g. associations); 2.) that the scheme itself
facilitates actors' exchange of resources to establish a temporary resource equilibrium; 3.) that all stakeholders
obtain returns on their investment, even if the quality and time scale of these returns may differ. The initiation
of the scheme by a pesticide company however increased both its political and market inﬂuence. Caution
hence has to be paid to whether the short-term improvement in land pollution happens at the expense of a de-
pendency on and increased use of certain kinds of pesticides.






Waste collectiononomy, Ministry of Agriculture,
a.1. Introduction
For several decades, China has been the largest consumer of pesticides
in the world (Sun et al., 2012), with a total consumption of
1.8 million tons (trading quantity) in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics
503S. Jin et al. / Science of the Total Environment 622–623 (2018) 502–509of China, 2014). Accordingly, extensive research has been carried out into
pesticides overuse and how pesticide use may be reduced (e.g. Hu and
Rahman, 2015; Jin et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Liu
and Huang, 2013). However, there has been a dearth of research on a
problem related to the extensive use of pesticides, i.e. the disposal of
empty pesticide packaging on agriculturalﬁelds. A survey by theResearch
Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) showed that 62% of Chinese farmers
randomly dump pesticide packages into or nearby water bodies after
they applied the pesticides (Wei and Jin, 2014). It is estimated that annu-
ally, over 3.2 billion pesticide packages are discarded in such a way in
China. The packaging waste weighs over 100,000 tons, and residue pesti-
cides from these packages account for 2%–5% of the total weight of pesti-
cides used (Jiao et al., 2012). The environmental harm of these discarded
pesticide packages is evident: residues pollute the water and soil ecosys-
tem, and can impact the health of humans and animals. Furthermore,
most of the packages are made of plastic, which will not easily degrade,
and will impact soil quality.
Research on the pollution of land and water bodies in China by waste
that accrues in the process of agricultural production has so far focused on
plastic mulching (Dai and Dong, 2014; Liu et al., 2014). Here, biodegrad-
able plastics have become a viable solution (Liu et al., 2014). However,
this solution is less applicable for pesticide packaging, given the nature
of the plastics required. Therefore, arrangements have to be made how
to collect this diffuse plastic waste so that it can be properly disposed.
Internationally, some examples exist for such collection schemes. In
Brazil, in 2002, by passing Decree 4074/02, actors within the agricultural
value chain (including e.g. retailers, cooperatives, government authori-
ties, farmers) became responsible for the proper disposal of agrochemical
packages. In 2009, 94% of pesticide packages were collected, whichmade
Brazil a frontrunner in the disposal of pesticide packaging wastes (InpEv,
2011). FAO/WHO in 2008 published a guideline outlining different man-
agement schemes and existing practices to collect, recycle and dispose of
pesticide packages. The guideline also lists successful schemes in devel-
oped countries such as Germany, Canada, Australia, and France (FAO/
WHO, 2008). In these countries, packages are collected by professional
organizations like companies or associations which were jointly
established with pesticide companies. However, not much research, to
the authors' knowledge, has been conducted on schemeswhere pesticide
packaging collection is foremost undertaken by individual farmers. These
schemes are likely to be more relevant in smallholder contexts that re-
quire more decentralized collection structures.
Literature conﬁrms that without such schemes, pesticide packages
are likely to lead to land andwater pollution. Damalas et al. (2008) pro-
vide anoverviewof farmers' disposal practices in a region in Greece, and
ﬁnd evidence of farmers either dumping empty containers in the ﬁeld,
or throwing them near or into irrigation canals or streams, if not burn-
ing them in open ﬁres. Similar ﬁndings are reported for Oman (Said Al
Zadjali et al., 2013), Vietnam (Pham Van Hoi et al., 2009), South Africa
(Dalvie et al., 2006), Ethiopia (Mengiste et al., 2015, 2016) and
Tanzania (Nonga et al., 2011). These studies reveal that especially in de-
veloping countries, the problem of pesticide package collection has not
been tackled yet.
Despite the severity of the problem in China, so far not much re-
search has been conducted. The only publication in English that looks
into the question of land pollution through pesticide packaging is Yan
(2014). In her dissertation, Yan shows that about three-quarter of sur-
veyed vegetable farmers in Hunan Province, China, dispose of pesticide
packages in the ﬁeld. Otherwise, a search of Chinese journals online
CAJD,1 using “topic = (pesticide packaging wastes) OR (pesticide pack-
age)” within the “Core Journals” returned only seven papers, from1 CAJD (ChinaAcademic Journal NetworkPublishingDatabase) is the largest database of
Chinese academic journals. Almost all papers published in China's journals since 1915 are
included. Similar with (Social) Sciences Citation Index, the “Core Journal” is the list which
includes the most inﬂuential journals based on their quality and citations. Search date is
04-11-2015.which the earliest paper was published in 2010. Of the seven papers,
Cai (2013) presents the results of a survey about farmers' Willingness
to Accept different kinds of pesticide package collection schemes. He
and Jin (2013) analyze international experiences of pesticide package
collection schemes, while Wei and Jin (2014) present the case of
Shanghai's pesticide collection scheme. In Shanghai, as the richest re-
gion in China and with a rather low share of agriculture (0.6% of its re-
gional GDP in 2013), public ﬁnance has subsidized up to 80% of
farmers' costs on pesticides. Under this scheme, farmers only receive
pesticide subsidies if they return empty packages to the governmental
collection station. As reported by Wei and Jin (2014), it is unlikely for
other parts of China to learn from Shanghai as the low share of agricul-
ture in regional GDP and Shanghai's overall economic development are
hardly representative for the rest of China.
Not only is there a lack of academic attention to pollution from pes-
ticide packages, Chinese policy so far has paid little attention to this
problem. In China, the problem of agricultural plastic waste in rural
areas has only recently become the object of policy-making. A review
of Chinese government documents (e.g. including laws, regulations,
governmental announcements) revealed that pesticide packaging
waste was ﬁrst dealt with, on a national level, in 2011, i.e. by the “Tech-
nical guideline on environmentally safe application of pesticides”, a vol-
untary guideline issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP). This guideline stated that “pesticide containers cannot be used
for other purposes, and intact containers can be collected by the re-
tailers or producers”. A document issued by the State Council in 2013
states that one of the major tasks to protect soils is “to establish
recycling systems for pesticide packages” (State Council, 2013).
Given this dearth of research and policy on collection schemes in
China, this article looks at the case of a pesticide packagingwaste collec-
tion scheme that was set up in Guangxi Province, China. The govern-
ment of Guangxi is relatively poor and therefore may not necessarily
have the means to devise a Pesticide Package Collection Scheme
(PPCS) based on subsidies and governmental investment, as in the
case of Shanghai. Therefore, the involvement of a private company be-
came pivotal in Guangxi. In this article, we will hence focus on the set
up, institutionalization andoutcomes of this scheme.Wewill particular-
ly analyze how actors' investment of different kinds of resources has led
to the institutionalization and particular design of the scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the study site and outlines the methodology employed. Section 3
shows the result of the Guangxi case. Section 4 discusses the case and
draws conclusions.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Study site
The research was carried out in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Re-
gion (Guangxi) in the south of China. Guangxi is one of themost under-
developed provinces. In 2013, the Per Capita Gross Regional Product of
Guangxi was 30,588 RMB. In terms of development the province ranks
27th out of 31 provinces, with only Tibet, Yunnan, Gansu, and Guizhou
having a lower Per Capita Product (NBS, 2014). Agriculture is the
province's primary economic sector and accounts for 16.3% of its Gross
Regional Product.
The PPCSwas initiated by a private pesticide company, with the par-
ticipation of sugarcane farmers. Guangxi is called the ‘Capital of Sugar’
and is the most important sugar producing province in China, account-
ing for 67% of the sugar produced in China. Sugarcane is the province's
most important cash crop. The sown sugarcane area accounts for
25.2% of the total farming area of the province.
The research was carried out foremost in Laibin Prefecture as this
was the ﬁrst local government that agreed to develop a PPCS with the
pesticide company KMK. And two towns (Xiaopingyang Town and
Qiaogong Town, both were the ﬁrst to participate the scheme) were
Fig. 1. “Actor-centered” framework for the PPCS.
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ginning of 2014.
2.2. Methods for data collection
A case study approach was applied, which allows studying a social
phenomenon through a thorough analysis of an individual case
(Kumar, 2005, 103). Such kind of analysis can be particularly useful
when researching new kinds of phenomena, as e.g. Pesticide Package
Collection Scheme in Guangxi.
Primary data was collected during a ﬁeld visit in March and April
2014. In-depth interviews, focus group meetings and a farmer survey
were carried out with related actors on site. The research steps were
as follows:
(1) Focus Group Meetings: To get an overview of the PPCS in
Guangxi, 3 groupmeetings were held both at the prefecture and district
(county) levelwith thehelp of the provincial agricultural bureau. Partic-
ipants included: the deputymayor of Laibin Prefecture; 12 ofﬁcials from
the extension service of Agricultural Bureau, the Environmental Protec-
tion Bureau, the Sugar Industry Administration Bureau, and the “Beauti-
ful Laibin Construction Ofﬁce” (an ofﬁce that was set up by the Guangxi
Government and is responsible for the coordination of activities under
the “Beautiful China construction” program of the 18th National Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China); also 4 managers of the local
sugar processing factories were present, as well as the manager of the
pesticide company KMK (see below). Notes were carefully taken during
the meetings. Through coding of the records, the history, technical pro-
cess, roles of different actors and their resource investment and gains
were obtained.
(2) In-depth interviews: To gain a better understanding of the im-
plementation of the PPCS, and to validate information from the focus
groupmeetings, 3 in-depth interviewswere carried outwith the Gener-
alManager of KMK and the technicalmanager. Noteswere taken during
the interviews, and were triangulated with information from focus
group meetings.
(3) Farmer survey: We collected 46 questionnaires from farmers of
two towns, among which 19 from Xiaopingyang Town and 27 from
Qiaogong Town. The sample is a stratiﬁed random sample as farmers
were selected according to their scale of sugarcane planting to ensure
the sample includes all farm scales. Descriptive statistics are used to un-
derstand whether and how farmers' behavior changed after joining the
scheme.
(4) Document analysis:We also collected and analyzed governmen-
tal documents including red-headdocuments,ﬁve year plans and statis-
tical yearbooks, and also annual reports of the pesticide company KMK.
From the above, we can see that the actors of the institutional ar-
rangement are government agencies, the pesticide manufacturer,
farmers, the extension service (agricultural bureau), as well as the
sugar cane processing industry. To some extent these actors correspond
to the actors identiﬁed by FAO (2008), only that FAO's waste manage-
ment and recycling organizations are not included because we focus
on the collection of pesticide packages which are deﬁned as hazardous
waste by law and cannot be collected by commonwaste recycling orga-
nizations. Agricultural colleges and schools, NGOs or farmer coopera-
tives, which are also listed in FAO (2008), do not play a role in the
case, and therefore are not included in the analysis.
2.3. Theoretical framework
The above mentioned scheme will be analyzed taking an “institu-
tional arrangement” approach as employed by Li et al. (2014) and as
originally developed byArts et al. (2006) (Fig. 1). “Institutional arrange-
ments” are part of actor-centered institutionalism which sees social
phenomena as the outcome of interactions between intentional actors,
while both actors and interactions are at the same time inﬂuenced by
their institutional context (Scharpf, 2000) as this context will to someextent deﬁnewhat type of actions are possible (Brandsen, 2001). Actors
are assumed to engage in temporary coalitions in order to establish a
scheme within the context of existing “rules of the game” (see also
Arts et al., 2006). Every actor will bring into the coalition resources
which the respective coalition partners depend upon. Furthermore,
each actor will bring into the temporary coalition certain “views and
narratives” on a problem and how to solve it (see Arts et al., 2006, 99).
Wewill hence refer to an institutional arrangement as “a temporary sta-
bilized actor network with resource dependencies among the actors
and speciﬁc rules of the game” (Li et al., 2014, 3199). In our analysis,
the “institutional arrangement” will provide the context for a more in-
depth analysis of the case study.
Focus of the analysis will be on the resources that actors bring to the
institutional arrangement. The analysis hereby focuses on the intersec-
tion of economics and politics, i.e. at how political factors inﬂuence
the economy and vice-versa. The reason for this focus is also the rather
unusual situation that in Guangxi, a Chinese private company started a
scheme for agricultural waste collection. If a company initiates the set-
ting up of an institutional arrangement, it can be assumed that the com-
pany may invest resources in the beginning to eventually receive
resources from other actors. These may be ﬁnancial resources and/or
other resources that the company may not have easy access to, with
the institutional arrangement helping the company to gain access. At
the same time, other actors may only get involved in an institutional ar-
rangement, e.g. provide their time, ﬁnancial resources or knowledge to
set up a PPCS, if they may beneﬁt from it. An institutional arrangement
hence facilitates actors to combine and complement a variety of re-
sources, which is also referred to as “mutual resource dependency”
(Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004, 352). Hence, we assume that in our
case an institutional arrangement has been successfully established if
it facilitates actors to combine and compliment their resources in a
way that their gains outweigh their losses. “Gains” hereby points at
the institutional arrangement helping a stakeholder to better fulﬁll
her/his organization's role of e.g. providing a public good.
Such a focus on resources has also been proposed by Brandsen (2001).
According to him, actor-centered institutionalism will analyze how indi-
vidual actors possess various levels of material resources and have access
to different social networks. While Brandsen (2001) distinguishes two
different kinds of resources, Li et al. (2014) list a variety of resources
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credit/support, knowledge, access to certain groups of actors, means of
communication, legal power, or access to market channels. For the case
at hand, we distinguish between two resources, i.e. economic resources
and socio-political resources. The latter refer to social and at times politi-
cal advantages that actors obtain due to their involvement in an institu-
tional arrangement, e.g. access to information, politicians or political
committees, or an increase in reputation within a certain policy domain.
These points show that when using this kind of actor based institutional-
ism, attention needs to be paid to the kind of resources this exchange in-
volves and which implications the exchange has for a stakeholder in
assuming his/her role and responsibilities.
In conclusion, using actor-centered institutionalismand “institution-
al arrangements”we structure our analysis by ﬁrst describing the insti-
tutional context in which the institutional arrangement is established
(i.e. the rules of the game), to then introduce and analyze the roles
and interests of actors who participate in the arrangement. This intro-
duction also includes actors' discourses and programs prior to the estab-
lishment of the scheme. Discourses here are the “views andnarratives of
the actors involved” (Arts et al., 2006, 99), i.e. how they deﬁne the prob-
lem at hand and the solutions they propose based on their general
norms and values. “Programs” refer to actors' measures to deal with
the problem at hand. Subsequently, under “stakeholder constellation”
we analyze how the institutional context deﬁnes “a set of positions
from which stakeholders realize the institutional arrangement” (see
Bluemling et al., 2010, 558), and how the institutional arrangement fa-
cilitates actors' exchange of resources to establish a temporary resource
equilibrium, showing the different resource gains and investments of
each actor. Given the actor-based understanding of an institutional ar-
rangement, it will be seen as in ﬂux, depending on how resource ex-
change develops. We hence will pay particular attention to the “on-
going institutionalisation… as a result of the interplay between the in-
teractions of actors” (Arts et al., 2006, 97).
3. Results
In the following, we ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce some important traits of
Guangxi Province's political economy to explain the general “rules of
the game”. Subsequently, actors will be described individually followed
by an analysis how they combine and complement their resourceswith-
in the PPCS.
3.1. Background
Sugar is considered a strategic agricultural product in China, next to
grain, cotton, and oil. Due to its particular importance to the country,
Guangxi's sugarcane sector is largely government-planned. The sugarcane
price is decided by the provincial government at the start of the crushing
season. The government also divides the land into sugarcane zones, and
farmers of a zone can only sell their sugarcane to the sugar processing fac-
tory (SPF) of the respective zone (seeAugustin-Jean, 2014, formore infor-
mation on Guangxi's sugar economy). Due to this trade relationship
between farmers andSPFs, the latter also play a role in the provision of ag-
ricultural inputs.When farmers buy inputs fromSPFs, they do not need to
pay immediately, but costs will be deducted from the ﬁnal sugarcane rev-
enues when farmers sell the sugarcane to the SPF.
Within the context of such a government-planned sugarcane sector,
a private company, Kai Mi Ke agro-technical service company (KMK),
entered the Guangxi market in 2009, to initiate the PPCS in 2011.
3.2. Actors of the institutional arrangement
The PPCS is understood to be both embedded in certain “rules of the
game”, i.e. the political economy of Guangxi's sugarcane industry, as
well as constructed by actors that pursue certain interests with estab-
lishing the scheme. These actors will be introduced below.(1) Kai Mi Ke (KMK)
KMK is a subsidiary company of the Hebei Haoyang Chemical Indus-
try Group which focuses on pesticide production. Haoyang Group is a
medium-sized company in China's pesticide industry, with an annual
pesticide production capacity of 3000 tons (active ingredients).
Established in 2009, KMK's major task is to sell the Group's pesticides
to Guangxi's sugarcane sector. KMK stresses environmental protection
in its marketing strategy, e.g. among its top targets are to build a ‘mod-
ern green system for crop protection’, and to ‘protect the earth’ (KMK,
2013). Consequently, different from other pesticide companies, KMK
claims to sell what it calls a ‘pesticide use service’which includes farmer
trainings, rather than pesticide products only. According to KMK, its
strategy is not to sell more pesticides to each household, but to sell pes-
ticides to more households.
In 2011, KMK initiated the Guangxi PPCS. This scheme was the –
somewhat unexpected – result of an ‘almost-successful-but-failed’ in-
ternational trade negotiation. The General Manager of KMK explained
how a visit of the Group's director triggered the initiative for a PPCS.
Our boss went abroad (Brazil) to sell our pesticides. Because of the
good quality of our products, he successfully persuaded a local retailer
to cooperate with us. During the discussion about the details of the
contract, we were required to establish a package recycling system
as a compulsory obligation to sell pesticides in the country. It was
the ﬁrst time that my boss heard about that. Though ﬁnally we did
not sign the contract because of the high costs to establish such a sys-
tem abroad, my boss felt that it might also be a trend in China, and
there was no company doing that. Since then, he started to search
for a suitable location to establish [such a system]. And ﬁnally, we
chose Guangxi for its open-minded leadership regarding new things.
Hong Xu, General Manager of KMK Guangxi (personal communica-
tion, 30.03.2014).
(2) Guangxi government
Generally speaking, in Guangxi as one of the most underdeveloped
provinces in China, economic development is the highest priority on
the government's agenda. This is reﬂected in “The 12th Five Year Plan
for Economic and Social Development of Guangxi” (The people's
Government of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, 2011). Mod-
ern industrial development here is listed as the ﬁrst priority. Agricultur-
al development focuses onmodern agriculture and related productivity
increases. Environmental protection prioritizes energy saving and re-
source saving, with little attention for agricultural pollution, let alone
pesticide packaging wastes.
However, in the end of 2012, the concept of “Beautiful China”was put
forward in the Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China (NCCPC). To respond to the central government's initiative,
Guangxi started its ‘Beautiful Guangxi, CleanCountryside’ action program.
The PPCS was included as an important part of this action program. Ac-
cordingly, at local level, similar action programs such as the “Beautiful
Laibin, Clean Countryside” were set up by the prefectural governments.
Organizations named “Beautiful Guangxi Construction Ofﬁce” or “Beauti-
ful Laibin Construction Ofﬁce” were established at different levels of
government.
(3) Sugarcane Processing Factories (SPFs)
To encourage farmers to plant sugarcane, SPFs buy pesticides direct-
ly from pesticide companies and provide them to the farmers of their
sugarcane zone. When farmers buy pesticides from a SPF, they only
need to pay when they sell their sugarcane. SPFs hence to some extent
mediate agricultural inputs to farmers. If an SPF includes a certain pes-
ticide in its portfolio, a PPCS canmake use of the SPF's advance payment
structure. For interviewed farmers, 82% of their pesticides were bought
from the SPF, and 18% came from other sources, such as village shops.
SPFs hence can be very important intermediaries for the implementa-
tion of a PPCS. Normally, depending on its processing capacity, one
SPF can cover 100,000–200,000 mu (i.e. about 6667–13,333 ha), com-
prising 5000–8000 farm households.
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According to the survey in two townships of Xingbin District, the av-
erage farm size is 34.3 mu (2.3 ha), out of which 31.5 mu (2.1 ha) are
plantedwith sugarcane. The average household income from sugarcane
is 59,284 RMB, accounting for 75.5% of the total household income. Sug-
arcane is a perennial crop, once planted, normally, it can be harvested
for ﬁve years. The crop is labor intensive as it is harvested manually.
3.3. Interaction, resource investment and gains of different actors
We ﬁrst indicate how the institutional context deﬁnes the position
of actors in realizing the PPCS, afterwhichwe outline how the collection
system works from a technical perspective, to then analyze how re-
source exchanges across actors led to the implementation of this
scheme. We here distinguish a pilot stage and an institutionalization
stage.
3.3.1. Stakeholder constellations
Though the schemewas initiated by a private company, the govern-
ment sets the rules of the game in the Guangxi sugarcane sector. It sets
the price of sugarcane, and laid down a rather ﬁxed trade relationship
between farmers and SPFs. Due to these rules of the game, KMK inter-
acts with several SPFs as intermediaries, rather than with thousands of
farmers, and it can use the governmental agro-technical extension sys-
tem to train farmers not to dispose of packages in the ﬁeld.
Given this context, we can understand the positioning of different
actors in the institutional arrangement. The government does not
make any new rules within the PPCS, but assumes that existing rules
are complied with. Any new rules brought forward by actors within
the PPCS should be approved by the government. KMK, as initiator of
and investor in the PPCS, designs the rules for the PPCS, and obtains ap-
proval from the government, after which these rules are integrated into
governmental regulation. SPFs are rule compliers, and partner with
KMK in implementing the scheme. Farmers are generally assumed to
be by and large rule followers, given the government-planned nature
of the sugarcane sector (see Augustin-Jean, 2014, for a discussion of
the government-farmer relationship in Guangxi's sugar economy).
3.3.2. Technical process
Technically, the ﬂow of collected packages is reverse to the direction
of pesticides sale. KMK sells its pesticides to contracted SPFs, who sell
the pesticides to their sugarcane farmers (and partly donate them for
free to encourage farmers to plant and sell sugarcane). Farmers return
empty pesticide packages to the collection station located at the SPF,
and the SPF calls KMK to transport the packages to the hazardous
waste disposal site. Currently, only KMK packages (plastic bags and bot-
tles) are collected. For each bottle, KMK pays 0.15 RMB for the collec-
tion. For each bag, KMK pays 0.2 RMB to the SPF. This latter amount
covers 0.02 RMB for the SPF collection center's maintenance costs;
0.02 RMB for the part-time coordinator who is employed by the SFP
and coordinates the collection of packages; 0.06 RMB for the village sug-
arcane coordinator, for collecting packages from farmers; 0.1 RMB for
the sugarcane farmers. Additionally, KMK pays 14,000 RMB/ton to the
hazard waste disposal company for the disposal of packages.
3.3.3. Evolution of shared discourses (pilot stage)
After its establishment in 2009, KMK submitted a report to the Dep-
uty President of the provincial government in 2010. In this report, KMK
emphasized the PPCS as part of its plan on Integrated PestManagement
(IPM) in Guangxi. The Deputy President made positive pishi2 on the re-
port. With this pishi, KMK started to search for cooperation partners2 Pishi is Chinese and means that a leader writes remarks on a document which was
submitted by a lower level ofﬁcial or department. Positive pishi from higher government
levels can be seen as an important achievement in one's work. For a company, positive
pishi increases the credibility of a project.within district governments. In 2011, KMK successfully persuaded the
government of Xingbin district, the largest sugarcane county in China,
to support the PPCS. Xingbin is administered by Laibin Prefecture.
Therefore, KMK motivated the Laibin Bureau of Agriculture, Laibin Bu-
reau of Environmental Protection, and the local Sugar Industry Develop-
ment Bureau to jointly submit a report to the Laibin Government to ask
for approval to implement the scheme in Xingbin. Only one week after
the submission of the report, the kick-off meeting was organized. To
show their support, ofﬁcials from agricultural and/or environmental
protection departments of provincial, prefectural, and county levels
attended the meeting. In ofﬁcials' speeches, ‘sustainable development’,
‘quality safety’, ‘environmental protection’, and ‘corporate social re-
sponsibility’ were frequently mentioned. These terms, but also termi-
nology from government documents (e.g. ‘Beautiful Guangxi’ or ‘clean
countryside’) were subsequently highlighted in KMK's advertisement
of the scheme. In the KMK annual report (KMK, 2014) on the PPCS,
the cover slogan is “To prevent agricultural non-point pollution, to pro-
tect the rural environment, by starting the collection of pesticide pack-
aging waste”. During the ﬁeld visit, banners with similar contents
were also frequently found in villages. Shared discourses created a con-
text for cooperation between the government and the company. The
PPCS as a concrete program helped to bridge the gap between the gov-
ernment objective to reduce pollution in the countryside, and the
company's interest to get a larger market share and increase proﬁts.
The company would not have been supported by the government if
KMK just had wanted to sell more pesticides. Therefore, KMK framed
its motivation in a way that the government bought into KMK's idea.
Even after the scheme received appreciation by the government, KMK
still praised the local government as the primary contributor to the suc-
cess, e.g. KMK describes the scheme as, “government dominating, com-
pany implementing, farmers participating, and market driven” (KMK,
2014).
3.3.4. Evolution through interaction and resource exchange among actors
(institutionalization stage)
In 2011, three SPFs in Xingbin District were involved in the PPCS.
After some time, the scheme appeared to bring beneﬁts to the different
actors involved. Farmers' sugarcane ﬁelds became cleaner, which im-
plied improvements in farmers' natural environment, and counted to-
wards the government's “Beautiful Laibin” program. SPFs reported
that, by using KMK pesticides, the sugar content of sugarcane would
have improved and would allow SPFs to get more sugar from the
same weight of sugarcane. Furthermore, farmers earned some money,
even if not much, by returning the packages. Consequently, actors be-
came more strongly involved in the scheme. In Fig. 2, we conceptualize
the dynamics during and after the pilot stage.
The Central Government, represented by related ministries, was not
substantially involved in the scheme in the pilot stage. In 2012, ofﬁcials
from the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) visited Laibin's PPCS. China Environmental Newspa-
per, which is the ofﬁcial organ of the MEP and is published nation-
wide, also published an article about the scheme. Both, the local govern-
ments of Guangxi and KMK, received nation-wide attention and reputa-
tion for their initiative. In 2013, MEP invited KMK to become a
committee member to write the draft of “Management Methods for
the Collection and Treatment of Pesticide Packaging Wastes”, which
made KMK very proud, for they participated in the design of national
policy.
The provincial government, in response to the call of the Central
Government's Beautiful China Construction program, made a plan on
“Beautiful Guangxi Construction” in 2013, in which 10 projects were
listed that deal with keeping the countryside tidy. The PPCS was listed
as the ﬁrst of the 10 projects. Even if the government does not pay for
the scheme, it can still make it a political achievement when it reports
to the Central Government. For KMK, but also for the governments of
Xingbin district and Laibin Prefecture, it is a signiﬁcant success that
Fig. 2. Interactions among actors in Guangxi PPCS.
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General Manager of KMK Guangxi: “The inclusion in the Plan makes the
PPCS more formal and ofﬁcial”.
The positive feedback from the provincial government strengthened
the conﬁdence of Laibin Prefecture in the PPCS, so that the prefectural
government started to encouragemore SPFs to join the scheme. They is-
sued several “Red-head Documents”3 to request the county and town-
ship governments and SPFs to support KMK. For most local Red-head
Documents related to the PPCS, KMK wrote the ﬁrst draft. Within the
Red-head Document, KMK is often listed as one of the major actors, to-
gether with Bureaus of Agriculture and other governmental actors.
Since the county government is responsible for dividing and allocat-
ing the sugarcane zones, it can easily get support from SPFs. However,
for SPFs, to join the PPCSwas not only away to show support to the gov-
ernment, butwas also seen as an opportunity to increase proﬁt. Asmen-
tioned earlier, SPFs reported that KMK pesticides would improve sugar
content.
Farmers can get some monetary compensation for little effort. Ac-
cording to the survey mentioned above, in 2013 each household3 Similar with pishi, a Red-head Document, hongtouwenjian, is neither a law nor a regu-
lation, but a frequently applied instrument in China with a strong administrative color.
Normally, if the government wants to push something forward, it can issue a red-head
document, which, to some extent, might bemore ‘effective’ to get an immediate outcome
than a law or regulation.received on average 22.2 RMB for returning pesticide packages. The sur-
vey also showed a change in farmer behavior and attitude with regard
to the dumping of packages. Over 85% of interviewed farmers indicated
that even if they were not compensated, they still would return pack-
ages. Many of them hope that all packages, including those from other
companies than KMK, can be collected, not only to increase their mon-
etary compensation, but also to have cleaner ﬁelds. A further beneﬁt
for farmers is that KMK usually works together with the local extension
station, to provide training and services with regard to pesticide use. As
a result, over 63% of the interviewed farmers indicated to have reduced
their pesticide use.
KMK gained much from the scheme in terms of public reputation
and establishing a working relationship with governmental depart-
ments of different levels. However, the company did not obtain imme-
diate economic beneﬁts from environmental protection activities for
which it nevertheless paid more than 4 million RMB. This imbalance
may only to some extent be explained by the company's argument
that it set up the scheme as part of its Corporate Social Responsibility.
By carrying out the PPCS, and especially after getting ofﬁcial support
from the government, more and more SPFs joined the scheme. These
SPFs increased their purchase of pesticides from KMK. Taking
Xiaopingyang SPF as an example, in 2011, the year the factory joined
the scheme, it bought 200 tons of pesticides fromKMK. After the factory
veriﬁed that KMK pesticides indeed improved sugar contents, and also
for the sake of establishing relationships with KMK, in 2013,
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more than half of the total amount of its pesticides purchase. The
other pesticides which are not bought from KMK come from pesticide
suppliers with long-term contracts from the past. However, the general
trend is that SPFs are buying more pesticides from KMK in counties
where the PPCS was implemented. In 2011, KMK pesticides covered
3.43 million Mu (= 228.667 ha) of sugarcane ﬁelds. In 2012 and 2013,
this area increased to 4.73 million Mu (=315.333 ha) and
6.27 million Mu (= 418.000 ha), respectively (KMK, 2014). KMK con-
siderably enlarged itsmarket share in Guangxi, and therewith increased
its turnover and proﬁts.
3.3.5. Resource distribution within the PPCS
As became clear from the analysis, all actors involved in the PPCS
gained from it, albeit in different ways. Especially KMK is no longer
only coordinating the collection of packages and paying for the scheme.
KMK plays a central role throughout the whole process in establishing
the institutional arrangement.
Table 1 provides a summary of resource investments and resource
gains from the PPCS for each actor. As mentioned above, we divide re-
sources into two categories, namely ﬁnancial and social-political re-
sources. From the table, we can see how resources, to varying degrees,
“balance out” across actors. The most straight-forward is the ﬁnancial
balance where one actor invests ﬁnancial resources and other actors
gain these resources. The interesting part is where an actor invests ﬁ-
nancial resources and gains social-political resources, as in the case of
KMK, where its investment realizes ﬁnancial resource gains for e.g.
farmers, coordinators and policy makers. We here understand that
KMK's socio-political gains will be realized as ﬁnancial gains at a later
point, e.g. KMK's participation in writing and discussing MEP “regula-
tion” has brought KMK advantages in comparison to its competitors in
the pesticidemarket. KMK does believe that once the collection of pack-
ages becomes a legal responsibility, rather than only a social responsi-
bility, and the cost of the PPCS is an internal cost of all pesticide
companies, the existing PPCS will transfer to a key advantage of KMK,
compared to its competitors who have never set up such a scheme.
In conclusion, an institutional arrangement has been successfully
established because the PPCS facilitates actors to combine andTable 1
Actors and their resource investments and gains from the Guangxi PPCS.
Actor Resource
category
Investment of own resources Re







Socio-political (Political) Leaders' “pishi”.
(Political) Red head documents.
(Time) Participation in meetings.
(E
(P
District Socio-political (Political) Leaders' “pishi”.




KMK Economic (Financial) Payment of 0.15–0.20 RMB/package.
(Financial) Costs for transportation & training.
(Financial) Payment of 14,000 RMB/t for ﬁnal
disposal.






SPFs Economic (Space) Land to establish collection center.





Socio-political (Knowledge, Time) Coordination of collection and
training.compliment their resources in away that their gains outweigh their losses
(sometimes at a later point of time).
4. Conclusion, discussion, and policy implications
Pesticide packages discarded on agricultural land can cause land and
soil pollution and can contaminate water bodies and hence not only
pose a threat to the environment but also to human health. Little is
known about how developing countries can deal with this agricultural
waste. This paper introduces and analyses a Pesticide Package Collection
Scheme in Guangxi Province, China. Implementation of this scheme is
the result of an effort of multiple parties, with a private pesticide com-
pany as the initiator. Due to tight public ﬁnances in Guangxi, the gov-
ernment may not have been able to implement a PPCS, which is why
it was comparatively easy for the company to get government support.
The company established a scheme that piggy-backs on Guangxi's sug-
arcane planned economy, and used the sugar processing factories as in-
termediary. Actors are hence set into relation through both the existing
political economic structure of Guangxi's planned sugarcane economy,
and the networking efforts of the pesticide company. By employing in-
formal policy instruments like pishi, and by helping local governments
to draft Red-head Documents, the company increased its inﬂuence in
policy-making and therewith shaped future political economic struc-
tures. While in principle, also other pesticide companies operating in
Guangxi Province could set up a PPCS, at this point, KMK's comparative
advantage will be difﬁcult to compete with. This article shows that
schemes for collecting pesticide packages can be established even in sit-
uations of low economic development. However, the institutionaliza-
tion of the PPCS in the case at hand has made the government
dependent on one particular pesticide company in order to overcome
land and soil pollution through pesticide packages. Attention hence
needs to be paid to the design of the institutional arrangement underly-
ing such a scheme. This design impacts the kinds of resource dependen-
cies that a scheme establishes. Hereby, it is pivotal that certain actors,
and here above all the state, still remain independent and integer in a
situation of mutual resource exchange. The state still has to maintain
its regulatory role. For example, it is unclearwhether the short-term im-
provement in land pollution happens at the expense of soil pollution insource gains/improvements
inancial) Get paid 0.10 RMB/package.
llage coordinators get 0.06 RMB/package.
nvironmental) Improvement of land and water environment.
e 10 farmers who return most of the packages will be awarded honorary credential
the county leader.
nvironment) Improvement of land and water environment.
olitical) Gains in reputation/credibility within “Beautiful China” discourse.
nvironment) Improvement of land and water environment.
olitical) Gains in reputation/credibility within “Clean Rural Guangxi Construction”
scourse.
inancial) Increased share in Guangxi pesticide market.
olitical) Established relationship and good reputation with government.
olitical) Access to decision-makers.
ocial) Increased public reputation.
inancial) 0.02 RMB/package for coordinator.
inancial) 0.02 RMB/package for storage.
inancial) Reported higher quality of sugarcane.
inancial) Pesticide costs deducted from revenues.
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through KMK implies a buy-in into more aggressive pesticides. For cer-
tain, KMK has obtained an inﬂuential position within the pesticide sec-
tor of the province, and the kind of pesticides it sells will have a large-
scale environmental impact.
In the case at hand, KMK's investment in pesticide package collection
paid off inmanyways, e.g. through political inﬂuence but also, ultimate-
ly, by increasing its market share. However, the dependency on the pes-
ticide company may come to the disadvantage of the natural
environment and of political integrity. If a pesticide company took the
initiative to establish a PPCS in other contexts, the government may in-
volve, at a certain stage, other pesticide companies in the setting up of
such a scheme. This would ensure that collection structures are not
too reliant on one particular pesticide company. Furthermore, those
who are involved would to some extent beneﬁt from establishing such
structures, by expanding their client base. However, increases in bene-
ﬁts would remain relatively low in comparison to KMK's gains.
In China, pesticide packages are deﬁned as hazardous waste by law,
with strict requirements on transportation and disposal, which implies
that the disposal of pesticide packages is costly. In order to avoid depen-
dency on one pesticide company, national law would at least need to
stipulate the compulsory collection of pesticide packages for all compa-
nies. This may not always need to come at as high costs as in the case at
hand. This research, but also similar studies in Hebei Province (see Wei
and Jin, 2016), show that farmers are willing to return empty packages
even without subsidy, since they see environmental improvements
after several years of PPCS implementation. In the case of Hebei, even
if there was no PPCS program, farmers still wanted to return empty
packages if it did not imply toomuch effort (Wei and Jin, 2016). One fur-
ther, more hands-on, bottleneck for collecting pesticide packages is
hence the setting up of a collection spot that is convenient for farmers
to return the packages to.
While in the case at hand, Guangxi's particular political economy
made it easier for thepesticide company to reach out to farmers because
SPFs play a crucial role as amediator between KMK and smallholders, in
other contexts, actors that could take over a similar coordinating role
would be cooperatives, agricultural service companies or large agricul-
tural companies with contracted farmers. Through cooperating with
those actors, pesticide companies do not need to directly interact with
thousands of smallholders and hence reduce their transaction costs in
collecting the packages.
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